The Brotherhood in Saffron Read online

  On some issues, the responses appear inconsistent with the RSS belief system. Two examples are the high degree of support for the right to strike (No. 6), and the opposition to agriculture organized on a cooperative basis (No. 14). The former assumes a certain measure of class consciousness, and the latter goes against the corporatist nature of the belief system. Strike was considered one of the more effective forms of protest against entrenched interest and an unresponsive government. Cooperative agriculture was opposed on the grounds that it would provide bureaucrats and politicians more opportunities to exploit the farmer. The labour affiliates of the RSS had on occasion expressed support for cooperative agriculture; however, the Jana Sangh had consistently opposed the idea. Rather, it had advocated stricter enforcement of land ceiling legislation and the distribution of land to the actual tiller of the soil.

  Distrust of the government and the bureaucracy among the respondents in this sample showed up in the negative response regarding the nationalization of industry (No. 11), and regarding exclusive government control of education and social welfare (No. 11 and No. 12). However, there is a certain degree of ambiguity in the world view of the RSS regarding the government. On the one hand, there is support for a unitary state strong enough to defend the country from external foes and from internal challenges. On the other, there is a pervasive suspicion that bureaucrats and politicians are self-centred and corrupt. Nonetheless, the Jana Sangh cadre did not oppose government interference in the economy or society generally. Indeed, the answers suggest that Myron Weiner’s proposition—that Indians expect the government to satisfy their economic and social aspirations—applies to most in this sample.111

  Yet support for strengthening the power of the central government (No. 8) appears inconsistent with the populist, anti-establishment mood of the cadre. Two considerations might explain the favourable response to the issue. One is the fear that centrifugal forces are a real threat to the unity of India and that Central government must have more police power to deal with the growing politicization of regional and linguistic demands and sectarian loyalties. The other consideration is the view that the government should use its powers to improve the economy generally and the well-being of individuals specifically. Note the strong support for the fourth item (i.e., No. 4; Table 8), which addresses this point. However, the respondents were quite clear that a stronger Central government does not imply an authoritarian form of government (No. 13). Many of the respondents, in answering No. 13, commented that a democratic form of government, whatever its faults, provided more opportunities to reorient government policy ‘in favour of the little man’ than an authoritarian system, which many assumed would serve the interests of the powerful elite.

  The cadre in this sample, on the whole, supported substantial changes in India’s social and economic systems. While they backed proposals that would result in a wider dispersal of economic and political power, they did not, in principle, support a more restricted role for the government in the country’s development. The RSS belief system legitimizes protest against India’s economic and political systems and hence, justifies the Jana Sangh’s efforts to mobilize the discontented.

  According to the interview data, those most likely to agree with the belief system of the RSS were the cadre who had demonstrated successful RSS socialization, as measured by prior advancement through the ranks of the RSS. The RSS belief system, however, is on a very high level of generality, and thus, it is not a precise blueprint for action on specific issues. The affiliates are responsible for applying the broad ideological principles to their own specific areas of interest, and they have considerable freedom of manoeuvre on this matter. Indeed, they have often influenced the views of the RSS regarding a wide range of issues. They have on occasion even acted contrary to the wishes of RSS leaders or the official policy set by the central assembly and the central executive committee of the RSS.

  Despite the obvious limits to the Jana Sangh’s mobilizing capacity imposed by the symbiotic linkage to the RSS, the cadre demonstrated considerable skill at party building and mobilizing support. They used political campaigns to mobilize electoral support. Party spokesmen promised benefits to potential support groups (e.g., higher pay to schoolteachers, higher procurement prices for farm commodities, more physical amenities to slum dwellers, etc.). The party appealed to diffuse nationalist and communal sentiments; party cadre and legislators also mobilized support through services they could render, such as providing citizens access to government officials, helping to unravel the maze of government regulations, and mediating community disputes. Starting in the 1970s, the party began to employ agitation on a wide scale to tap the discontent against inadequate government performance.

  The RSS leaders, for their part, were initially hesitant to accept the legitimacy of the political system established in the immediate post-Independence period, but over time they began to take a more instrumental view of the political process. No Jana Sangh official proposed any fundamental change in India’s constitutional system, and RSS theorists have advanced such proposals more as a theoretical exercise than as a real call for change. Undoubtedly, at least part of this support for democracy comes from the recognition that the RSS cluster of organizations has a better opportunity to carry out its work under a democratic system than under some authoritarian form of government.

  6

  The Triumph of Activism

  The RSS in the 1970s confronted a series of political Challenges that pushed it and its affiliates towards a significantly higher level of activism. These challenges buttressed the position of activist leaders who wanted to make their organizations more relevant to the practical problems faced by the people, and who were more willing to employ confrontational tactics to do so. While there are many senior figures who still see the RSS role in the limited context of character building, the need for political protection in the 1970s tilted the scales, perhaps decisively, towards the activist side though the RSS continued to shun a political role for itself.1 Direct political action would undermine the role the RSS defined for itself as a moral guide above partisan strife. Direct involvement in politics would also again make it a likely target of political attack.

  By the mid-1970s, when a state of Emergency was declared and the RSS was banned, the RSS was prepared to cooperate closely with a wide range of groups, many of whom had previously demanded restrictions on its activities. Mutual suspicions were significantly reduced during the 1975–77 Emergency when the RSS cadre worked closely with a wide variety of groups to oppose the restrictions on civil liberties. The ‘family’ of RSS organizations adopted a more liberal interpretation of Hindu nationalism. While the RSS (and its affiliates) is still criticized for its Hindu orientation, the RSS is no longer the pariah organization that it was for most of the period since India’s independence in 1947.

  POLITICAL ASSERTIVENESS OF THE RSS

  By the mid-1960s, the RSS was beginning to regain its self-confidence. The organization began to add new shakhas, members, and full-time workers, which enabled it to breathe renewed life into the affiliates. Signs of the renewed assertiveness were Golwalkar’s acceptance in 1964 of an invitation to address RSS-affiliated groups in Burma (now Myanmar) and the organization’s offer in 1965 to King Mahendra of Nepal to address a Makar Sankrant (winter solstice) festival. The Government of India, probably reflecting the still deep suspicions of the RSS, refused to allow the visit of the Nepalese king or to permit Golwalkar to leave the country. Still another indication of a more assertive RSS was the address of General Secretary Deoras to Jana Sangh delegates attending the 1965 annual session at Gwalior, the first time a national RSS official had done so.2

  Suspicions of the political influence of the RSS, stoked by the success of the Jana Sangh in the 1967 national elections and subsequent state elections (attributed in part to the help given it by the RSS), made the RSS a political target. The split of the Congress party in late 1969, raising the possibility of a non-Congress coalition governme
nt at the Centre with Jana Sangh participation, further stoked the fires of concern regarding the political intentions of the RSS. In addition, apprehensions regarding the RSS were exacerbated by a series of communal riots in the late 1960s. The Jana Sangh for its part was branded as communal because of its links with the RSS, and those opposition parties which cooperated with the Jana Sangh were tarred with a similar communal brush. Some senior figures in the Congress party even sought to discredit their factional opponents by charging them with being RSS sympathizers.

  The mounting criticism of the RSS in the late 1960s, including demands at very high levels of the governing Congress party that it be banned, alarmed the RSS leadership. The need for political protection again become salient. Against this backdrop, the RSS leadership supported a united front among the non-communist opposition parties to place a brake on the power of the Congress party. The central policymaking body of the RSS—the Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha (the central assembly)—gave its blessing to United Front governments which had been formed in several states.3 Balasaheb Deoras, general secretary of the RSS between 1965 and 1973, encouraged the increasing activism of the student and labour affiliates (the Vidyarthi Parishad and Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, respectively). The RSS also launched its own mass public relations campaign in the late 1970s to counter charges regarding its alleged role in communal riots.

  In the political field, the perceived need of the RSS for protection strengthened the activist stance associated with Atal Bihari Vajpayee, president of the Jana Sangh during the late 1960s and early 1970s. He advocated an alliance strategy among opposition parties; he orchestrated the party’s leftward move on economic issues; and he involved the party in agitation. The party’s more populist stance was resisted by a vocal conservative element led by Balraj Madhok, party president during 1966–1967.4 Madhok tried unsuccessfully to get the RSS to back him in his dispute with Vajpayee. Bitterly criticizing the RSS, he left the Jana Sangh in 1972.

  The poor performance in the 1971 parliamentary elections of the so-called ‘grand alliance’ of opposition parties which included the Jana Sangh, followed by the mediocre performance of the Jana Sangh in 1972 state assembly elections, forced the RSS to look for protection beyond traditional party structures. The RSS condoned the increasing militancy of its student and labour affiliates between 1973 and 1975. The most dramatic example of such militancy was the increasing politicization of the Vidyarthi Parishad, which became involved in movements directed against the Congress party governments of Bihar and Gujarat during this period. In Bihar, the Vidyarthi Parishad participated in a statewide protest that accepted the Total Revolution concept of Jaya Prakash Narayan, a respected social reformer. Narayan advocated the replacement of a political system dominated by professional politicians with a form of participatory democracy. He initially directed his criticism at the Bihar state government, but in late 1974 concluded that no fundamental changes could take place unless the Total Revolution was broadened to include the centre on the grounds that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi controlled the policies of the state governments dominated by her Congress party. Thus the stage was set for a confrontation between the RSS, which supported Narayan’s Total Revolution, and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

  The Government of India in 1975 charged that the RSS ‘family’ of organizations was a force in the movement supporting Total Revolution, and with some justification.5 From late 1974, the Jana Sangh was closely involved in Narayan’s activities. On 25 and 26 November 1974, Jana Sangh leaders met in Delhi with their counterparts from other opposition parties to establish a national coordination committee that would back Narayan’s movement of Total Revolution. Organiser, the unofficial mouthpiece of the RSS, reported that the Jana Sangh leaders were considering a ‘prolonged war of attrition in which civil disobedience and no-tax campaigns would play their due role’.6 Balasaheb Deoras, at a 1 December 1974 rally in Delhi, called Narayan a ‘saint’ who had ‘come to rescue society in dark and critical times’.7 The Vidyarthi Parishad was already deeply and directly associated with Total Revolution.

  While the central assembly of the RSS took the unusual step of supporting Narayan’s Total Revolution, the RSS leadership did not deviate from the organization’s traditional policy of keeping the RSS itself aloof from political activities, and it continued to do so until after the July 1975 ban on the RSS. However, RSS leaders certainly encouraged swayamsevaks ‘in their individual capacity’ to get involved.8

  Narayan for his part publicly praised the RSS (and other members of the ‘family’). At the annual Jana Sangh session in March 1975, he dismissed charges that the Jana Sangh was ‘fascist’.9 At an RSS camp two months later, he complimented the RSS for its efforts to reduce economic inequality and corruption.10 Such praise from a respected national figure like Narayan was a major achievement for the RSS as it reached out for public acceptance and for political protection.

  Events during the first half of 1975 placed the RSS on a collision course with the government.11 Following several months of student-led demonstrations in which the Vidyarthi Parishad played an active role, the Congress party government of Gujarat resigned in March 1975. Several opposition parties, including the Jana Sangh, formed the Janata Morcha, an electoral alliance, which won a majority in the June assembly elections there. On 5 June, the Allahabad High Court declared Prime Minister Gandhi’s 1971 election to parliament invalid due to violations of the election law. The opposition immediately called for her resignation. On 25 June opposition party leaders met with Narayan in Delhi to form the Lok Sangharsh Samiti (LSS), a coordinating body to direct the activities of the Total Revolution. Nana Deshmukh, the organizing secretary of the Jana Sangh and a former RSS pracharak, was named its general secretary. On the evening of 25 June, Narayan gave a speech in New Delhi appealing to the military not to obey an ‘illegal order’. The next morning, Prime Minister Gandhi declared a state of Emergency, ordered the arrest of political opponents and imposed a censorship on the press. On 30 June Balasaheb Deoras was arrested,12 and on 4 July the RSS and 23 other organizations were banned.13

  The initial reaction of the RSS leadership was to take a cautious wait-and-see approach. When the government began to arrest RSS workers on a large scale, the RSS committed itself to working closely with the LSS, thus breaking the RSS tradition of keeping the organization aloof from political movements. This decision was taken at a meeting of leading pracharaks at Bombay in late July, after consultation with the incarcerated Balasaheb Deoras.14 Holding primary responsibility for coordinating RSS work with the LSS were four zonal pracharaks: Yadavrao Joshi (south), Moropant Pingale (west), Bhaurao Deoras (east), and Rajendra Singh (north). In addition, Rambhau Godbole, the Jana Sangh’s organizing secretary for Bihar and West Bengal, was instructed to establish contact with opposition party leaders; Moropant Pingale to coordinate activities with the LSS and to organize a nationwide satyagraha; Eknath Ranade, head of the Vivekananda Kendra, to handle discussions with the government.15

  The July meeting in Bombay established a set of goals for the underground RSS organization: It would (1) maintain the morale of the swayamsevaks by providing them opportunities to meet together (e.g., prayer meetings, sporting events, etc.); (2) establish an underground press and distribution system for it; (3) prepare for a nationwide satyagraha, establishing contact with significant non-political figures and with prominent representatives of the minority communities; and (4) solicit overseas Indian support for the RSS in the underground activities of the LSS. Regarding this last goal, the RSS made use of the Indians for Democracy, an organization established in the US immediately after the Emergency. In November 1976 the Friends of India Society, International, was formed in England to mobilize overseas swayamsevaks for the same purpose.

  The grass-roots structure of the LSS included many RSS workers, which presented the RSS cadre with an unprecedented opportunity to gain political experience and to establish a working relationship with political leaders. This RSS activism p
romoted the careers of dynamic pracharaks, such as Rajendra Singh (now the RSS general secretary) and H. V. Sheshadri (now zonal pracharak for the southern states, where the RSS has recently experienced its most rapid growth).

  RSS activism reached a high point during the 1975–77 Emergency and set the stage for a more dynamic organization in the post-1977 period. Regarding the Emergency period itself, RSS publications claim that the swayamsevaks played the key role in the underground movement, constituting the ‘backbone’ of the LSS, according to one senior RSS official.16 The RSS had also mobilized its extensive support network among overseas Indians to publicize the anti-Emergency effort internationally and to smuggle literature into the country. Whatever the extent of the cadre’s role, no one doubts that it was significant. Even Prime Minister Indira Gandhi admitted in late 1975 that ‘there has been no let up in its [RSS] activity. They are now functioning in an organized underground manner. Even in a region like Kerala, the RSS has established a foothold.’17 RSS sources claim that over 25,000 of its members were arrested under the Defence of India rules and an equal number under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, many of them during the November 1975–January 1976 satyagraha organized by the underground RSS.18 Nana Deshmukh, a former RSS pracharak with close ties to the top RSS leadership, was asked by Narayan to assume ‘full powers’ of the LSS when Narayan was arrested.19 Deshmukh had earlier been selected by Narayan to be the secretary of the LSS, perhaps because of the major involvement of the RSS ‘family’ of organizations in the movement of Total Revolution. Following Deshmukh’s arrest in October 1975, Ravindra Varma, a Congress (O) politician, took charge. He was succeeded in November 1976 by D. B. Thengadi, a former RSS pracharak who was then general secretary of the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh.